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We use survey data to study American households' propensity to default when the value of their mortgage
exceeds the value of their house even if they can afford to pay their mortgage (strategic default). We
find that 26% of the existing defaults are strategic. We also find that no household would default if
the equity shortfall is less than 10% of the value of the house. Yet, 17% of households would default,
even if they can afford to pay their mortgage, when the equity shortfall reaches 50% of the value of
their house. Besides relocation costs, the most important variables in predicting strategic default are
moral and social considerations. Ceteris paribus, people who consider it immoral to default are 77%
less likely to declare their intention to do so, while people who know someone who defaulted are 82%
more likely to declare their intention to do so. The willingness to default increases nonlinearly with
the proportion of foreclosures in the same ZIP code. That moral attitudes toward default do not change
with the percentage of foreclosures in the area suggests that the correlation between willingness to
default and percentage of foreclosures is likely to derive from a contagion effect that reduces the social
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For the first time since the Great Depression, millions of American households find themselves 
with a mortgage that exceeds the value of their home. According to Zillow.com, in the entire 
United States, 22% of households have negative equity in their home, while in some areas of the 
country (such as Las Vegas and some areas in California) this percentage exceeds 50%.
1 More 
importantly, the difference between the value of the mortgage and that of the house is often  very 
large. For example, the median owner‘s equity for those who bought their house in the Salinas, 
CA  metropolitan  statistical  area  (MSA)  in  2006  is  -$214,305.  Given  the  magnitude  of  this 
phenomenon, it is important to address the question of whether homeowners with such a large 
negative equity value will choose to walk away from their houses even if they can afford to pay 
their mortgages. The answer to this question is crucial to assess the near term future of the real 
estate market  and of the U.S.  economy in  general.  Not only strategic defaults  may produce 
contagion effects, they can also exercise price pressure on sales. Campbell et al. (2009) estimate 
that forced sales due to foreclosure sell at 28% discount on the house‘s value. 
  Unfortunately, we know very little about this question. In an influential paper, Foote et al. 
(2008) show that during the 1990-91 recession in Massachusetts very few people (6.4%) chose to 
walk  away  from  their  houses  when  their  home  equity  was  negative.  This  paper  has  deeply 
influenced  the  Obama  Administration‘s  policy,  which  has  entirely  focused  on  reducing 
households‘ cash flow problems, ignoring the negative equity problem. While the Massachusetts 
recession and real estate crisis in the ‗90s approximates the average US economic recession and 
real  estate  crisis thus  far,  if there are  nonlinearities in  the behavior of  borrowers, it is  very 
important to analyze not the behavior in an average region, but the behavior of households in the 
regions where house prices have dropped much more than the average, and where the percentage 
of  borrowers  with  negative  equity  exceeds  national  averages.  As  Figure  1  shows,  mortgage 
delinquencies do not seem to be affected much by the house prices when house prices drop less 
than  20%  (the  Massachusetts  peak  to  trough  decline  in  the  early  1990s).  After  that  level, 
however, there is a strong correlation between the two.  If, as this picture suggests, nonlinearities 
are important, the Foote et al. evidence is unlikely to have a strong predictive power in areas 
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where close to half the households have negative equity and the magnitude of this negative 
equity approaches 40%.  
While  only  few  states  have  mandatory  non-recourse  mortgages  (i.e.,  do  not  allow 
creditors to pursue borrowers who walk away from their mortgages for the difference between 
the amount of the mortgage and the resale value of the house), the cost of legal procedures is 
sufficiently  high  that  most  lenders  are  unwilling  to  sue  a  defaulted  borrower  unless  he  has 
significant wealth besides the home. Given the limited legal punishment, it is important to study 
the economic and non economic incentives for strategic default. Not only are we interested in 
estimating the likelihood of this event as a function of the decline in house prices – an potentially 
important economic motive for strategic default - but also what other non-economic factors can 
increase or decrease this likelihood. In fact, if social and moral considerations play a role, it is 
important to understand how economic policy may have an indirect effect on the likelihood of 
strategic default via its impact on the bite of social and moral norms. For example, a policy 
aimed at helping people in arrears with their mortgages could have devastating effects on the 
incentives  to  strategically  default  of  people  who  can  afford  to  pay  their  mortgage  if  it  is 
perceived to bail out people unjustly and thus undermine the moral commitment to pay.  
Assuming that a homeowner will default as soon as his home equity becomes negative is 
clearly wrong. Negative equity may be a necessary conditions to trigger default, but it is not a 
sufficient one (see Deng, et al., 2000; Bajari et al., 2008). Even in the absence of any social and 
moral considerations, there are several economic reasons not to default. First, if the interest on 
the mortgage is less than the rental of an alternative house, the homeowner has an advantage in 
delaying the default. Second, walking away from the house involves  relocation costs. Third, 
defaulting on the mortgage ruins a person‘s credit rating, with negative consequences on his 
future ability to borrow. Finally, if the mortgage is a recourse-loan, the borrower faces the risk of 
losing any assets he might have if the lender comes after him with a deficiency judgment.    
In addition to these pure economic reasons, individuals may have moral considerations 
that affect their willingness to default. Default can be perceived as morally wrong and as such 
something to avoid if not at all costs, at some significant cost.  Moral norms, if widespread, may 
strongly mitigate the likelihood that Americans households will default on their mortgage, even 
if the value of housing continues to depreciate. The effectiveness of moral rules, in turn, may be 
affected by economic policies that may undermine a sense of fairness.  4 
 
Finally, even amoral people can choose not to default when it is in their narrow economic 
interest to do so because of the social costs this decision entails. For example, defaulting on a 
mortgage may lead to social stigma.  
It is difficult to study the strategic default decision, because it is de facto an unobservable 
event. While we do observe defaults, we cannot observe whether a default is strategic. Strategic 
defaulters have all the incentives to disguise themselves as people who cannot afford to pay and 
so they will appear as non strategic defaulters in all the data.   
Given this constraint, one way to assess the likelihood of a strategic default is to estimate 
a structural model of default that includes both cash flow considerations and negative equity 
considerations. One can then use the estimated parameters to simulate a shock to home equity 
alone and compute the predicted effect. This strategy has been followed by Bajari et al. (2008), 
who estimate that ceteris paribus a 20% decline in home prices would lead to a 15% increase in 
the probability that a borrower would default.  
An alternative way, which we follow in this paper, is to resort to survey data. While 
survey data have the obvious drawback in that they that are responses to hypothetical questions, 
rather than actual decisions with monetary consequences, they do have several advantages. First, 
they allow us to study how households would behave when their home equity reached negative 
amounts not commonly reached yet. One of the problems of the current recession is that it is so 
extreme in  its  intensity  that one has to  strongly believe in  linearity to  extrapolate estimates 
obtained during the past recent recessions to predict the outcome of the current one. Second, 
survey data provide an opportunity to separate contagion effects from sorting effects, which is 
difficult  to  do  with  field  data.  By  asking  questions  about  social  and  moral  attitudes  toward 
default, we can identify whether the high propensity to default in areas where foreclosures are 
more  frequent  is  due  to  a  clustering  in  those  areas  of  individuals  prone  to  default  or  to  a 
contagion effect.  
For these reasons, we study the incentives and costs of strategic default by using some 
new data on a representative sample of US households surveyed in December 2008 and March 
2009. We asked the respondents information about their home ownership and the date when they 
bought or refinanced their house. Moreover, we asked the following questions: ―If the value of 
your mortgage exceeded the value of your house by 50K would you walk away from your house 
(that is, default on your mortgage) even if you could afford to pay your monthly mortgage?‖ 5 
 
where  people  could  answer  ―yes,‖  ―no,‖  or  ―I  do  not  know.‖  For  people  who  answered 
negatively, we repeated the same question with a negative equity of 100K.  For people who 
answered negatively, we repeated the same question with a negative equity of  200K (March 
survey) or 300K (December survey). In addition, we asked whether the respondent thought it 
was  morally  wrong  to  walk  away  from  a  house  when  one  can  afford  to  pay  the  monthly 
mortgage. Finally, we asked a list of questions about their political views and their views about 
recent economic policies and current events.  
Consistent with Foote et al. (2008), we find that no household is willing to default if the 
equity shortfall is less than 10% of the value of the house. The percentage of households willing 
to default strategically increases to 5% if the shortfall is between 10 and 20% of the value of the 
house and reaches 17% when the shortfall reaches 50%.  
We correlate the declared willingness to walk away when the equity shortfall is equal to 
$50K/$100K  with  various  proxies  for  the  typical  economic  drivers  of  this  decision:  cost  of 
relocation (number of children, numbers of years in the current location), the risk of losing other 
assets (whether the respondent is in a nonrecourse state and whether the household has more than 
$50k  in  financial  assets),  the  stability  of  the  financial  position  (income  and  probability  of 
becoming unemployed). Not surprisingly, the biggest determinants are the value of the equity 
shortfall as a percentage of the value of the house and the fact that the house was bought more 
than 5 years ago – a measure of the attachment to (and thus of the cost of leaving) the current 
location. Ceteris paribus a person who has bought his house more than five years ago is 78% less 
likely to default. A one standard deviation increase in the relative size of this equity shortfall 
increases the probability of strategic default by 24%.  
The more surprising results emerge when we add moral and social considerations. 80% of 
the people think it is morally wrong to do a strategic default. Everything else being equal, people 
who do not think that it is immoral to default even if able to repay are 7.4 percentage points less 
likely  to  declare  strategic  default  (a  79%  in  the  sample  mean)  than  people  who  think  it  is 
immoral when the equity shortfall is $50K. The effect of this moral barrier weakens when the 
equity shortfall increases to $100K: from 79% to 57% of the sample mean. This moral barrier to 
default is an important and often ignored aspect of the default decision.  
To  explore  the  origins  of  this  conviction,  we  correlate  it  with  several  demographic 
variables. Younger people (less than 35 years old) are less moral, but so are older ones (older 6 
 
than  65).  More  educated  people  exhibit  less  moral  conviction  as  do  African  Americans. 
Wealthier people have higher moral standards, while people from the Northeast and the West 
less so. Interestingly, we do not observe any correlation between how upset people are about the 
current economic situation and their opinion about the morality of strategic default. Yet, we do 
find  a  strong  correlation  between  the  positive  opinion  about  the  need  of  a  Government 
intervention  to  help  homeowners  near  default  and  the  view  of  morality  of  default,  but  this 
correlation cannot be interpreted in any causal sense. It is likely to be the manifestation of the 
fact that people differ in their view on the moral commitment embedded in a debt contract. 
Those who think there is none are more willing to help households in default.  Finally, we do not 
find any difference in the moral view of Republicans and Democrats. The less moral ones are the 
Independents.   
As a measure of social considerations, we use either the percentage of foreclosures in the 
same ZIP code or the positive answer to the question whether the respondents personally know 
somebody who defaulted strategically. In both cases, we find that people who have been exposed 
more to defaults are more willing to strategically default. Holding morality constant, people who 
know someone who defaulted strategically are 82% more likely to declare their intention to do 
so. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of foreclosed property in the 
ZIP code increases the likelihood of a strategic default by 23%. This effect is highly nonlinear. 
When we fit a linear spline, we find that the effect of the percentage of foreclosures is zero for a 
percentage  of  foreclosures  less  than  16%,  yet  it  becomes  not  only  statistically,  but  also 
economically  very  significant  above  that  level.  A  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  the 
percentage of foreclosures above the 16% threshold doubles the probability of strategic default. 
This result hints at the possibility of vicious circles, where an initial shock in foreclosures leads 
to a reduction in the value of houses (which increases the percentage of people with negative 
equity) and reduces the social constraints to default, both factors that lead to more defaults and 
foreclosures. 
One obvious limitation of our analysis is that it is based on declared intentions, not actual 
decisions. It is possible, albeit unlikely, that people respond that they are willing to walk away, 
but then they do not actually do. To validate our results and estimate the importance of strategic 
defaults on actual defaults in the March survey we asked each interviewed person ―How many 
people do you know who have defaulted on their house?‖ To those who know at least one, we 7 
 
also ask ―How many people do you know who have walked away from his/her house (that is, 
defaulted on their mortgage) even if he/she could afford to pay the monthly mortgage?‖ By 
taking a ratio of the two we get an estimate of the percentage of actual default that is considered 
―strategic‖ by their acquaintances: this rate is 26%. Another indirect validation is the pattern of 
mortgage delinquencies as a function of the drop in house prices and unemployment. When we 
regress mortgage delinquencies (at the MSA level) on the changes in unemployment and the 
drop in house prices we find that mortgage deliquencies are not sensitive to a drop in house 
prices  as  long  as  the  drop  in  house  prices  is  no  more  than  20%.  After  that,  the  mortgage 
delinquencies are  very  sensitive to  the drop in house prices  even controlling for  changes  in 
unemployment, suggesting that people default because of the size of their negative equity, not 
just because they cannot afford to pay.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the theoretical framework. 
Section 2 describes the new survey data used in the paper. Section 3 presents some MSA-level 
evidence of the nonlinearity in the relation between mortgage delinquencies and house prices, 
suggesting the importance of strategic default.  Section 4 presents the result of regressing the 
declared intention to make a strategic default on individual and ZIP-code level characteristics. 
Section 5 presents the results on the determinants of the moral cost of default.  Conclusions 
follow. 
 
1.  The Theoretical Framework  
The narrowest economic framework would hold that in non-recourse states a household will 
default whenever the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house. While negative 
equity is a necessary condition for strategic default, it is not a sufficient condition. In practice, 
even in non recourse states there are frictions that make defaulting less appealing. First of all, 
there are significant pecuniary and non-pecuniary relocation costs, which include difficulty in 
renting or buying a new house, moving expenses, possible change of school for the children, and 
loss of friends in the community (unless one can easily relocate around the corner).  To add to 
these costs, there is some specificity in the housing stock. Most people remodel their house to fit 
their needs. After this remodeling they are likely to pay a premium for their house with respect to 
a similar house with the same general characteristics. As proxies for these relocation costs we 
use the age of the person (where older people have a higher cost  to  move), the number of 8 
 
children (more children, the higher the relocation cost), whether the children go to local schools, 
and whether s/he has bought the house more than five years ago (the longer the tenure, the 
stronger the attachment to the house and thus the higher the relocation cost).
2  
In the presence of moving costs, relocation is a (partially) irreversible investment with an 
uncertain payoff. Thus, there is some value in waiting. With uncertain house prices, the option to 
wait  is  more  valuable   because  the  higher  the  volatility  of  house  prices ,  the  higher  the 
expectations that they will recover. Since the survey asks about the long-term expectations about 
house prices, we will use those.   
    In addition to relocation costs, when an individual defaults his credit rating is very 
severely affected, reducing his future chances to buy a house or more generally to borrow. It is 
not entirely clear for whom this cost should be higher: for young people with a marginal credit 
rating, which will find it very difficult to restore it or for richer people with a good credit rating, 
since they lose more. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the credit rating, bu t we have other 
characteristics (such as income and age) that should proxy for that.  
If the mortgage is a recourse-loan, an individual faces the risk of being forced to pay the 
remaining amount, if the lender comes after him with a  deficiency judgment. More risk-averse 
people, thus, should be less likely to default. Also richer people should be less likely to default. 
As a proxy for income, we have a self-reported income bracket and a self reported ass essment 
whether they had  more than $50,000 outside of t heir home. We chose this level because a 
rational lender is unlikely to sue a borrower who has less than $50,000 in wealth.  
In addition to these pure economic reasons, individuals may have  moral considerations 
that affect their willingness to default. Def ault can be perceived as morally wrong and as such 
something to avoid if not at all costs, at some significant cost.  Moral considerations, if 
widespread, may strongly mitigate the likelihood that Americans households will default on their 
mortgage, even if the value of housing continues to depreciate.  Non-economic incentives to 
default and obedience to moral norms, in turn, may be affected by  what other people do and by 
economic policies that may undermine a sense of fairness.  
Finally, even amoral people can choose not to default when it is in their narrow economic 
interest to do so because of the social costs this decision entails. In a society where the vast 
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majority of people think it is immoral to default when able to repay, people who do that can pay 
a  social  cost.  In  this  context,  the  perceived  cost  of  this  decision  might  be  affected  by  the 
frequency  with  which  people  default.  For  this  reason,  we  asked  if  they  know  people  who 
defaulted and we also use the percentage of foreclosure, assuming that the more common it is for 
people to default, the more socially acceptable is to do so.  
 
2. The Survey Data 
Our main data sources are two waves of the Chicago Booth Kellogg School Financial Trust 
Index  survey.
3  Each  survey,  conducted  by  Social  Science  Research  Solutions,  collects 
information on a  representative sample of 1,0 00 American households. The main purpose of 
these surveys is to study how the level of trust people have in the financial system will change 
over time. We did, however, include variables that  can help us assess the frequency and the 
determinants of strategic defaults. The first wave of the survey took place  from the 17
th to the 
28
th of December 2008.
4  The second wave took place the third week of March 2009.  One adult 
respondent in each household was randomly contacted and asked whether they were in charge of 
household financials, either alone or together with the spouse. Only individuals who claimed 
such responsibility are included in the survey.   
The survey collected information about de mographics, home ownership, the  date of 
purchase or refinance of the house,  and the fraction borrowed. Most of the questions in the two 
surveys are the same. In the second survey, however, we added a few more variables to control 
for some characteristics of th e borrower, so the regressions limited to the second survey have 
more control variables. 
2.1 Strategic Default Variables   
To elicit information about the individuals‘ willingness to commit strategic default, we 
asked the following question: ―If the value of your mortgage exceeded the value of your house 
by 50K would you walk away from your house (that is, default on your mortgage) even if you 
could afford to pay your monthly mortgage?‖ Among the homeowners, only 9 percent answered 
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4 The survey was conducted using ICR's weekly telephone omnibus service. It used a fully-replicated, stratified, 
single-stage random-digit-dialing sample of landline telephone households 10 
 
affirmatively to this question (see Table 1a). We restrict our analysis to homeowners for two 
reasons. First, if there are significant differences in the characteristics of homeowners vs. non-
homeowners, to predict the actual defaults, we are interested in the responses of the former and 
not  the latter. Second, the question is  more realistic for a homeowner, who might  face this 
decision, rather than for a renter, who might never face it and does not have a clear sense of what 
are the costs of leaving a owned house.  
Those who answered negatively to the decision to default at -50K were then asked ―If the 
value of your mortgage exceeded the value of your house by 100K, would you walk away from 
your house (that is, default on your mortgage) even if you could afford to pay your monthly 
mortgage?‖    Of  the  respondents,  26%  answered  ―yes.‖  The  respondents  who  had  answered 
negatively to the last question were finally asked the same question, but with a higher difference 
between the mortgage and the value of the house. In the December survey, this value was 300K, 
in the March survey, 200K. Interestingly, the difference between the two is not so large. Forty-
one percent of the respondents declare they would default if their negative equity equals 200K, 
while 45 percent declare so if the negative equity is 300K. 
 
2.2 Morality of Strategic Default     
Respondents were also asked ―Do you think that it is morally wrong to walk away from a 
house when one can afford to pay the monthly mortgage?‖ A large majority (81%) respond 
positively to this question. While considering strategic default morally wrong does not prevent 
people from doing so, the propensity to default strategically is much higher for people who think 
strategic default is morally acceptable. As Table 1a shows, 20% of the ―immoral‖ people are 
willing to default if the negative equity equals -50K vs. 7% of the ―moral‖ones. The gap is even 
bigger at    -100K: 41% vs. 22% and remains very large (in fact, increases slightly) when we 
move to -200K (59% versus 37%) and -300K (63% versus 38%).   
Given these are answers to a survey it is possible that the responses are affected by the 
subjects‘ desire to ―look good‖ in the eyes of the interviewer.  If this is the case, respondents who 
are concerned about their social image are more likely to say that they are unwilling to default 
and that default is morally wrong. We do not regard this as a major problem. Since default is a 
publicly observable variable, the very same people who do not want to appear as bad people to 
the interviewer will also be less likely to default so as to not appear as bad people in front of their 11 
 
neighbors. If we think—as it is likely—that the social pressure is stronger when there is no 
money on the table than when there is a lot, then the likelihood of actual default should be closer 
to the declared probability of default of the ―immoral‖ people (who are less sensitive to social 
pressure) than to the ―moral‖ ones.  
 
2.3 Diffusion of Strategic Default     
To capture the diffusion of defaults in a certain area we constructed a ZIP-code level 
variable with the percentage of mortgages in foreclosures. From RealtyTrack.com, we collected 
the number of foreclosures in December (for the December survey) and in March (for the March 
survey) for each ZIP code represented in the survey. We then multiplied this number by 12 (to 
turn it into an annual figure) and divided it by the number of mortgages in the same ZIP code as 
of December 31, 2008. The number of outstanding home-related loans is from the Analytical 
Services group at Equifax (Mian and Sufi, 2009).
5  The results, presented in Table 1b, show that 
the average percentage of foreclosures is 4%, with a median of 2% and a standard deviation of 
39%.    
To measure the diffusion of  actual strategic defaults in the December survey, we asked 
―Do you know anyone who has walked away from his/her house (that is, defaulted on their 
mortgage) even if he/she could afford to pay the monthly mortgage?‖ Of those interviewed 8.4% 
of  the  responded  affirmatively.  While  this  question  gives  us  a  measure  of  the  exposure  to 
strategic default, it does not give us an estimate of the percentage of defaults that are strategic (at 
least in the eyes of their acquaintance). For this reason, in the March survey we asked first ―How 
many people do you know who have defaulted on their house?‖ and then  ―How many people do 
you know who have walked away from his/her house (that is, defaulted on their mortgage) even 
if he/she could afford to pay the monthly mortgage?‖  By taking a ratio between the answer to 
the  second  and  the  first  question,  we  get  an  estimate  of  the  percentage  of  default  that  is 
considered strategic. We obtain that 26% of the observed defaults are considered strategic.     
With these two different sets of questions, we construct a dummy variable common to the 
two surveys  that indicates  whether the  respondent  knows at  least  one person who defaulted 
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strategically. Overall, 9% of the households know somebody who defaulted strategically while 
26% of the households know somebody who defaulted.  
   
2.4 Other variables     
  In  the  second  survey,  we  ask  directly  for  an  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  house. 
Unfortunately, the first survey does not contain a similar question. To compute one, we average 
the  value  of  the  house  in  the  second  survey  by  income  class  and  then  apply  this  value  to 
respondents in the first survey, on the basis of their declared income bracket. The value of this 
house and the percentage that 50K and 100K represent of the value of this house is reported in 
Table 1a. On average, 50K represents 34% of the value of the house and obviously, 100K, 68%.  
To measure individuals‘ attachment to their current house, we asked them how long ago 
they  bought  their  home.  Unfortunately,  in  the  first  survey  this  question  is  mixed  with  the 
refinancing decision (When did you buy or last refinance your house‖), while in the second it is 
separate.  In spite of this distortion, we find that 69% of the respondents bought the house more 
than 5 years ago.   
Besides standard demographic variables, the survey collects also information some more 
specific ones summarized in Table 1b.  We measure risk attitudes by using a question previously 
asked and validated by Dohmen et. al (2008): ―On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is unwilling and 
10 fully willing, are you generally a person who is willing to take risk?‖  To obtain a measure of 
risk aversion, we recode it so that 1 indicates a person fully willing to take risk and 10 a person 
totally unwilling to take risk. On average, this measure equals 6 (standard deviation 2.5).  
To measure individual expectations about house price appreciation, we ask them ―In the 
next 5 years do you think house prices will…‖ where there are five possible responses that go 
from  ―1:  Increase  a  lot  (greater  than  20%)‖  to  ―5:Decrease  a  lot  (greater  than  -20%).‖  On 
average, people expect moderate increase in house prices over the next 5 years (between 5 and 
20%). Once again we recoded the variable so that 1 means decrease a lot and 5 increase a lot. 
We also elicit a subjective probability of unemployment by asking ―On a scale from 0 to 
100, where 0 equals ―absolutely no chance‖ and 100 equals ―absolutely certain‖, what do you 
think are the chances that you will lose your job during the next year?‖ On average, respondents 
think they have a 13% chance to become unemployed within the following 12 months, with a 
median equal to 0 and substantial heterogeneity (standard deviation 26%).  13 
 
  Finally, we tried to measure the feeling respondents had in the (then) current economic 
environment by asking how angry they were (―On a scale from 1 to 5 with 1 being ‘not angry at 
all‗ and 5 being ‘very angry,‘ how angry are you about the current economic situation?‖) and 
their  attitude  toward  using  Government  money  to  help  homeowners  (―Do  you  think  the 
Government  should  intervene  to  help  homeowners  who  are  defaulting?).  People  exhibit  a 
moderately high level of anger 3.7 out of 5, with a median of 4 and a slight majority in favor of 
helping homeowners (53%).  
 
3. MSA-level evidence  
While direct evidence of strategic default at the aggregate level is hard to gather, we start 
by looking at some indirect evidence. First of all, our discussion on the determinants of strategic 
default suggests that strategic default does not occur when home equity just turns negative, but 
only when it is significantly negative. Since homeowners typically have an equity cushion at 
least of 10% of the value of the house, we do not expect strategic default to play any role until 
house prices have dropped significantly more than 10%.  In Figure 1, we plot the fraction of 
existing mortgages that are at least 120 days late at the end of 2008 by MSA (obtained from 
Equifax) on the changes in house prices from their peak (per Zillow.com). As the plot shows, 
there is very little relationship between the two in MSAs where house prices dropped less than 
20% from their peak. By contrast, this relationship becomes very strong in areas where house 
prices dropped more than 20%.  
Figure  2  shows  that  this  effect  goes  through  the  magnitude  of  the  negative  equity. 
Unfortunately, we do not have an estimate of the home equity of all the households by MSA 
level, but Zillow.com provides an estimate for the amount of equity of the median household 
who  bought  a  house  in  2006.  Not  surprisingly,  there  is  a  negative  relationship  between 
delinquencies and home equity at any level of home equity, since households with cashflow 
problems can more easily pay their mortgages by refinancing if they have positive home equity. 
This relationship becomes stronger, however, when the median household has a negative equity 
that exceeds 10%.    
In Table 2, we explore these relationships in a more systematic way. In Column 1, we 
show that changes in unemployment in 2008 predict the end of 2008 mortgage delinquencies at 
the MSA level. Once we control for the drop in house prices, however, the coefficient of the 14 
 
change in unemployment loses statistically significant, while that of the change in house prices is 
both statistically and economically significant (Column 2). A 10% drop in house prices increases 
the proportion of delinquent mortgages by 1.4 percentage points (a 36% increase with respect to 
the sample mean).  In columns 3 and 4, we split the sample on the basis of the magnitude of the 
house price drop. In MSAs where the drop in house prices is above the median, house price 
changes  have  a  large  effect  on  delinquencies:  a  10%  drop  in  house  prices  increases  the 
proportion of delinquent mortgages by 1.9 percentage points (almost a 50% increase with respect 
to the sample mean). By contrast, in MSAs where house prices dropped less than 17% (the 
median drop), neither unemployment nor house price drop have any effect in explaining the 
proportion of mortgage delinquencies.  
In Column 5 and 6, we redo the split based on the level of unemployment. The effect of 
house prices is present in both samples, but it is stronger in the areas where the increase in 
unemployment is larger.   
This evidence, while consistent with strategic default, is also consistent with the existence 
of non-linearities in non-strategic defaults. It is well possible that the MSAs with the largest 
decrease  in  house  prices  are  also  the  ones  that  have  the  sharpest  deterioration  of  the  real 
economy. In these areas, households may be less likely to make their monthly payment because 
of underlying economic reasons. Thus, to explore the existence and the importance of strategic 
default, we resort to survey data.    
 
   4. Determinants of Strategic Default  
In section 2.3, we found that according to their acquaintances, 26% of the actual default are 
strategic, i.e. are done by people who can afford to pay their monthly mortgages. In this section, 
we try and use our survey data to see what the determinants of these strategic defaults are.   
 
4.1 Non parametric analysis  
We start with a nonparametric analysis of the responses. Figure 3 reports the percentage 
of respondents who declare they would default strategically as a function of the magnitude of the 
equity  shortfall  relative  to  the  value  of  their  own  house.  Figure  3A  is  obtained  using  the 
responses obtained for a 50K shortfall and the percentage of shortfall is 50K divided by their 15 
 
reported value of the house. Figure 3B is obtained using the responses obtained for a 100K 
shortfall and the percentage of shortfall is 100K divided by their reported value of the house.  
Figure 3A shows that no respondent is willing to default strategically if the negative 
equity shortfall is less than 10%. This percentage rises almost linearly to 17% if the value of the 
shortfall is in the 50-60% range. As already seen in Table 1A, this percentage is much higher for 
people who think it is morally acceptable to default at all levels of the shortfall above 10%. 
Albeit the relation is non monotonic (probably due to the paucity of observations), the fraction of 
those willing to default strategically among the ―immoral‖ people raises from 0% to 27% as the 
shortfall increases from 10 to 50-60%.  
Figure  3B,  which  uses  the  answers  for  when  the  shortfall  is  100K,  shows  the  same 
pattern, but at a higher level. The percentage of people willing to do strategic default goes from 
7% if the value of the shortfall is less than 10%, to 25% if the value of the shortfall is between 
50% and 60% of the value of the house.    
 The difference between the level of responses (if not the trend) can be easily attributed to 
the fact that the decision to default is not only driven by an assessment of how big the shortfall is 
relative to the personal wealth, but also how large it is in absolute terms. 
Figure 4 reports the percentage of respondents who are willing to do strategic default as a 
function  of  the  frequency  of  foreclosure  in  the  same  ZIP  code.  The  figure  shows  that  the 
percentage of strategic default is constant until the percentage of default remains below 5%. Past 
that, there seems to be a raising trend, especially when we use the answers to the 100K shortfall 
question. We are going to explore this point further in the regression analysis.     
 
4.2 Parametric Analysis 
  In  Table  3,  we  regress  individual  responses  to  the  question  on  strategic  default  on 
individual characteristics. In Panel A the dependent variable equals 1 if the answer to the ‗walk 
away‘ question is yes when the shortfall is $50K. All the estimates are obtained through a probit 
regression and the coefficients reported are the marginal effects computed at the average value of 
the independent variables.  
We start (Column 1) with only the second survey, for which we have more individual 
characteristics. As measures of relocation costs, we insert the age of the respondent (less than 35 16 
 
years and more than 65), the number of kids, whether the kids go to local schools, and whether 
the house was bought more than five years before 2009.  
  As proxies for the financial cost of this decision, we insert the fraction of the shortfall 
with respect to the value of the house, the expectation about house price increases, the existence 
of significant assets outside the retirement account, the level of income, and the probability of 
being unemployed. As measures of the riskiness of this decision, we insert a dummy equal to 1 if 
the individual lives in a non-recourse state (i.e., the lender cannot go after his/her wealth outside 
of the house) and our measure of risk aversion. Finally, we control for several demographic 
variables like the macro geographic areas they live in (not reported) and the respondent‘s race.  
Of all these variables, the most significant (both from an economic and a statistical point 
of view) are the value of the shortfall as a fraction of the value of the house, the attachment to the 
house, measured by whether the house was bought more than five years ago, and whether the 
respondent is young. The first two variables have the expected sign. When the shortfall increases 
by 10% of the value of the house, the probability of strategic default increases by 1 percentage 
point (11% of the sample mean). People who bought more than five years ago are 7 percentage 
points less likely to declare a strategic default. More surprising is that young people are less 
willing to walk away (6 percentage points). One possibility is that the young are more dependent 
on the loans market and thus face higher reputation costs from defaulting, which in this sample 
outweigh the effect on the propensity to default of their lower relocation costs. More marginally 
significant is the expectation about future house prices: the higher the expectation, the lower the 
probability of default. Moving from the expectation that house prices will remain flat (a value of 
3 in our response scale) to a moderate increase (a value of 4) decreases the probability of default 
by only 2 percentage points.  
In Column 2, we show that not much is lost if we restrict our attention to the variables 
present in both surveys. So, in Column 3, we merge the two surveys. The results are very similar. 
The major difference is that now older people are more likely to declare that they want to default 
while the effect of younger people becomes zero. Also the perceived probability of becoming 
unemployed  becomes  statistically  significant.  An  increase  in  the  probability  of  becoming 
unemployed of 10 percentage points increases the probability of declaring default in case of 
negative equity by one percentage point.  17 
 
 In Column 4, we insert a person‘s view on the morality of declaring strategic default. A 
person who considers it immoral to walk away from a mortgage when one can afford to pay its 
monthly cost is 7.2 percentage points less likely to declare strategic default (79% of the sample 
mean). This variable appears orthogonal to all the other factors, whose coefficients are virtually 
unchanged.  
In Column 5, we insert the percentage of foreclosures taking place in the same ZIP code. 
This variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of being willing 
to default strategically. A one-standard deviation increase in the percentage of foreclosures in the 
area increases the probability of a strategic default by two percentage points (24% of the sample 
mean).  
 In Column 6, we try to dig deeper into the source of this effect by inserting a dummy 
variable equal to one if the interviewed person knows somebody who did a strategic default. The 
coefficient of this variable is positive, but not statistically significant.  
There are two potential problems in interpreting these results. First, since the question: 
―Do you think that it is morally wrong to walk away from a house when one can afford to pay 
the monthly mortgage?‖ was  asked  after respondents  answered the questions  about  strategic  
default,  to  be  consistent  and  provide  justification  to  their  behavior,  respondents  who  have 
declared that would strategically default may state that they do not think it is immoral to do so. 
In this case, the correlation between strategic default and morality could be simply an artifact of 
the  survey.  In  principle,  the  data  are  suggesting  the  opposite.  While  less  than  20%  of  the 
respondents think it is morally acceptable to walk away, 9% are willing to walk away with a 
shortfall of 50K, 26% with a shortfall of 100K and 41% with a shortfall of 200K. Thus, there are 
many that first report that they would default after declare who it is immoral to do so, even if 
they had the opportunity to justify their stated behavior by answering that it is not immoral. 
Nevertheless,  we  cannot  completely  rule  out  that  declared  morality  may  partly  reflect 
justification of defaults (creating an artificial positive correlation) nor that our index of morality 
is measured with error (biasing the effects of morality on default downward). To account for this, 
in column (7) we run a two step model in which we instrument morality with two indicators 
variables of whether the respondent is a Democrat or a Republican. Both these variables have 
strong prediction power on morality (F test for the instruments in the first stage regression is 18 
 
above  11;  see  also  Section  5).  The  qualitative  results  stay  the  same,  but  the  coefficient  on 
morality increases 7-folds, suggesting that error in measuring morality may be an issue.  
The second problem arises in interpreting the coefficient of the fraction of foreclosed 
mortgages as evidence of a contagion effect. In principle, what appears as a contagion may in 
fact  be  the  result  of  a  correlated  effect  due  to  a  clustering  of  individuals  with  similar 
characteristics. In this case this fear is reduced, if not eliminated, by the fact we are able to 
control for personal opinions on morality and for the value of the shortfall. In addition, in Table 
5 we will be able to show that there is no evidence that people with weaker moral attitudes 
toward default tend to congregate in ZIP codes where defaults are more frequent.      
If we remove the percentage of foreclosures in the ZIP code (Column 8), the effect of 
knowing  somebody  who  did  a  strategic  default  increases  in  size  and  becomes  marginally 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Quantitatively, though, the effect is large. Knowing 
somebody who did a strategic default increases the willingness to make a strategic default by 8 
percentage points (82% of the sample mean). In Column 9, we also insert a personal opinion on 
whether the Government should help homeowners in trouble. The effect is positive, but not 
statistically significant.   
Table 3B repeats the same analysis with a slightly different dependent variable. In this 
table, we use the willingness to default when the negative equity shortfall is equal to 100K. 
Consequently, when we measure the value of the shortfall with respect to the value of the house 
we divide 100K by the value of the house.  
By and large the results are very similar, but there are some interesting differences. The 
coefficient on the dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the house had been purchased more than 
five years before 2009 halves in value and becomes statistically insignificant. This is consistent 
with the idea that relocation costs and emotional attachment to the house is an effective barrier 
against default at a low level of negative equity. When the equity shortfall becomes bigger, this 
effect vanishes.  The second major difference is that at 100K negative equity, Hispanics are 
much more likely to default than black or white. Depending upon the specifications, the effect 
varies between 18 and 27 percentage points (between 70 and 112% of the sample mean).  
The marginal effect of the moral view doubles in size (15 percentage points), but slightly 
decreases as a percentage of the sample mean (from 77% to 57%). The same is true for the effect 19 
 
of house foreclosures in the same ZIP code area, which increases 50% in absolute size, but drops 
in half as a percentage of the sample mean.  
Finally, a respondent view on whether the government should help homeowners becomes 
highly statistically significant. People who answer yes to that question are nine percentage points 
(35% of the sample mean) more likely to declare they want to do a strategic default when their 
negative equity equals 100K.  
If the effect of foreclosures on the willingness to default is the result of some form of 
weakening social pressure or norm, it is likely to be non linear. In fact, Figure 4 seems to suggest 
that the effect increases nonlinearly with the percentage of foreclosures. For this reason, in Table 
4 we rerun the last specification of Table 3A and splicing the percentage of foreclosures variable 
at the 75% level of foreclosures, which corresponds to 16% of foreclosures. As Table 4, shows 
the effect of foreclosures on the willingness to default is zero up to the 16% threshold and is both 
economically and statistically important above that threshold.  In the 50K shortfall regression, a 
one-standard  deviation  increase  in  the  percentage  of  foreclosures  in  the  area  increases  the 
probability of a strategic default by 4 percentage points (46% of the sample mean), while in the 
100K, it is regression by nine percentage points (36% of the sample mean).  
Overall,  we  find  that  the  most  important  variables  in  predicting  the  likelihood  of  a 
strategic default are moral and social considerations. Social considerations are directly affected 
by the frequency of foreclosures and the probability that somebody knows somebody else who 
strategically defaulted. What factors drive the morality consideration? We investigate this next.  
 
5. The Moral View of Strategic Default  
81% of the respondents think it is morally wrong to default on a mortgage when you can afford 
to pay it. Table 5 tries to explore how this moral attitude differs across socioeconomic groups. 
The regression is a probit model, where the dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent 
declares  that  it  is  morally  wrong  to  default  if  one  can  pay  the  mortgage.  The  estimated 
coefficients are the marginal effects computed at the mean of the independent variables.  
Not surprisingly, younger people are 12 percentage points (15% of the sample mean) less 
likely to think it is morally wrong to default (see Column 1). More surprisingly, older people are 
also less likely to think it is morally wrong to default, while the effect is roughly half. More 
educated people are less likely (8 percentage points) to think it is morally wrong to default and 20 
 
so are African American (14 percentage points). Richer people are more likely to think that 
default is morally wrong. One standard deviation increase in income increases the likelihood of a 
positive response by 1.92 percentage points.   
In Column 2, we add some geographical dummies. Default is perceived as morally wrong 
less in the Northeast (6 percentage points) and the West (8.5 percentage points). The remaining 
coefficients are unchanged.  
In  Columns  3  and  4,  we  explore  whether  the  knowledge  of  other  defaults  (or  other 
strategic defaults) changes a person moral stance. In both cases, we find that there is no evidence 
of that. If anything, both variables have a positive effect, in the sense that being in an area with a 
lot of foreclosures increases one‘s moral stance against strategic default rather than reducing it. 
This effect could reflect a resentment for the negative externalities strategic defaults impose on 
the neighbors‘ property. Alternatively, it could be due to the fact that the temptation to default is 
higher in areas where there are a lot of foreclosures (which are areas where house prices have 
fallen a lot) and thus people need to hang on more strongly to their moral beliefs. Finally, it 
could be a self selection effect: people who did default strategically are unlikely to answer a 
phone survey. Regardless of the reason, there is no evidence that areas where there are a lot of 
defaults are areas where people have weaker norms against default.  
In Column 5, we explore whether the attitude toward strategic default differs according to 
political  opinions.  Self-reported  Republicans  are  9.5  percentage  points  more  likely  than 
independents  to  think  that  strategic  default  is  morally  wrong,  but  so  are  the  self  reported 
Democrats, albeit much less do (5.7 percentage points). In other terms, independents are really 
the most ―immoral‖ from this point of view.  
Given that moral consideration represents an important barrier to default, one risk is that 
some  economic  decisions,  otherwise  aimed  at  improving  the  situation,  might  have  perverse 
effects by undermining the moral determination not to default. For this reason, in Column 6 we 
insert  a  measure  of  how  people  feel  angry  about  the  current  situation.  The  effect  is  both 
economically and statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
This effect seems to be present, when we insert a dummy variable equal to one if the 
respondent thinks the government should help the homeowners (Column 7). The coefficient is 
negative and statistically  significant.  Individuals  who think that the  government  should help 
homeowners are 12 percentage points less likely to say that strategic default is morally wrong. 21 
 
Interestingly,  when  we  introduce  this  variable,  there  is  no  longer  a  difference  between 
Republicans  and Democrats.  This  result is not surprising, as  Democrats  are overwhelmingly 
more  likely  to  support  help  for  homeowners,  thus  this  control  is  correlated  with  being  a 
Democrat. This result is also not just limited to the attitude towards homeowners. If we substitute 
the opinion on whether the Government should help homeowners with a similar question on 
whether  the  Government  should  help  banks,  we  obtain  the  same  result.  Hence,  the  attitude 
toward using government money to help distressed situation is negatively correlated with the 
perception of the morality of a strategic default.   
In unreported regression, we test whether other political opinion/perception of fairness in 
the system are correlated with the perception of morality of strategic default. We do not find any 
statistically significant relation, suggesting that the  morality question is fairly stable and not 
affected by current events.  This result is interesting, per se, suggesting that this opinion are 




Both the Bush and the Obama administration policies are based on the presumption that 
the  current  housing  crisis  is  only  due  to  the  excessive  burden  current  mortgage  payments 
imposed on many households: no attempt has been made to resolve the negative equity problem, 
i.e., the fact that 22% of U.S. households have a mortgage that is bigger than the value of their 
house and might have a strong temptation to walk away from their mortgages even if they could 
afford to pay.  
While these people are unlikely to walk away when the amount of this negative equity is 
small,  very  little  is  known  about  their  willingness  to  walk  away  when  the  negative  equity 
becomes large in absolute value. Our survey data addresses this gap. We find that relocation 
costs and other considerations prevent homeowners from defaulting as long as their negative 
equity does not exceed (in absolute value) 10% of the value of their house. After that level, they 
start to default at an increasing pace, reaching 17% of households defaulting strategically when 
their equity shortfall reaches 50% of the value of their house.  
The most important barriers to strategic default seem to be moral and social. Ceteris 
paribus, people who consider it immoral to default are 77% less likely to declare their intention 22 
 
to do so, while people who know someone who defaulted are 82% more likely to declare their 
intention  to  do so.  While  moral  attitudes  toward  default  do  not  seem  to  be  affected  by  the 
surrounding environment nor by the anger people exhibit vis-à-vis the current environment, the 
social pressure not to default is weakened when homeowners live in areas with high frequency of 
foreclosures or know other people who defaulted strategically. Our results suggest that these 
contagion effects should be seriously considered in public policy regarding housing.    
  
 





Bajari, Patrick, C. Sean Chu, and Minjung Park (2008). ―An Empirical  Model of Subprime 
Mortgage Default From 2000 to 2007.‖ NBER Working Paper 14625. 
 
Campbell, John Y., Stefano Giglio, and Parag Pathak (2009), Forced Sales and House Prices, 
working paper, Harvard University.  
 
Deng, Yongheng, John M Quigley, and Robert  van Order (2000), ―Mortgage Terminations, 
Heterogeneity, and the Exercise of Mortgage Options,‖ Econometrica, 68(2): 275-307.  
 
Foote,  Christopher,  Kristopher  Gerardi,  and  Paul  Willen  (2008).  ―Negative  Equity  and 
Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence.‖ Journal of Urban Economics, 64(2): 234-245. 
 
Dohmen,  Thomas,  Armin  Falk,  David  Huffman,  Uwe  Sunde,  Jürgen  Schupp  and    Gert  G. 
Wagner  (2005),  ―Individual  Risk  Attitudes:  new  Evidence  from  a  Large,  Representative, 
Experimentally validated Survey‖ German Institute for Economic Research Discussion Paper 
511. 
 
Gerardi,  Kristopher,  Adam  Hale  Shapiro,  and  Paul  S.  Willen  (2008).  ―Subprime  Outcomes: 
Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences,  and Foreclosures.‖ Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston Working Paper. 
 
Mian Atif and Amir Sufi (2009), The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence 
from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, Quarterly Journal of Economics.  
 
Quigley, John M., and Robert van Order (1995). ―Explicit Tests of Contingent Claims Models of 
Mortgage Default.‖ The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 11(2): 99-117. 
 
Vandell, Kerry (1993). ―Handing Over the Keys: A Perspective on Mortgage Default Research.‖ 




Figure 1: Delinquent mortgages and house prices 
On the y-axis there is the fraction of existing mortgages that are at least 120 days late by MSA area. The data is from 





Figure 2: Delinquent mortgages and negative equity 
On the y-axis there is the fraction of existing mortgages that are at least 120 days late by MSA area. The data is from 








Figure 3: Percentage of homeowners willing to default as a function of the equity shortfall 
On the y-axis there is the fraction of homeowners who claim they will default if the equity in their house was equal to  
-50K (-100K). On the x-axis the ratio between the negative equity amount (-50K/-100K) and the self-reported value of 
the house of that person.  Source:www.financialtrustindex.org. 
 






































































Figure 4: Percentage of homeowners willing to default as a function of the foreclosures in the area 
On the y-axis there is the fraction of homeowners who claim they will default if the equity in their house was equal to  
-50K (-100K). Source: www.financialtrustindex.org. On the x-axis the percentage of initiated foreclosures as a fraction of the 
total number of outstanding mortgages in the ZIP code in which the homeowner lives. Source: www.realtytrack.com and 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Data are from two waves of the Chicago Booth –Kellogg School Financial Trust Index survey.  Each survey, conducted by 
Social Science Research Solutions, collects information on a representative sample of 1,000 American households. The first 
wave of the survey took place from the 17th to the 28th of December 2008.   The second wave took place the third week of 
March 2009. One adult respondent in each household was randomly contacted and asked whether they were in charge of 
household financial, either alone or together with the spouse. Only individuals who claimed such responsibility are included in 
the survey.  We only examined data for people who declare themselves homeowners.  
Negative equity=50K is the percentage of people that answered yes to the question ―If the value of your mortgage exceeded 
the value of your house by 50 thousand dollars would you walk away from your house (that is, default on your mortgage) even 
if you could afford to pay your monthly mortgage?‖;  for the people who answered negatively, we asked ―If the value of your 
mortgage exceeded the value of your house by 100 thousand dollars would you walk away from your house (that is, default on 
your mortgage) even if you could afford to pay your monthly mortgage?‖; Negative equity=100K is the percentage of people 
answering yes to the latter question.   For people who answered negatively, we repeated the same question with a negative 
equity of 200 (March survey) or 300K (December survey).  
Percentage of foreclosures in the area is the ratio between the monthly foreclosures (in December 2008 for the first wave 
survey, and in March 2009 for the second wave) and the number of outstanding home-related loans in the zipcode as of 
December 2008, multiplied by 12. The monthly foreclosures are the total number of properties that receive foreclosure notices 
(default notice, foreclosure auction notice, or bank repossession) (source:  Realtytrac).  The number of outstanding home-
related loans is from the Analytical Services group at Equifax (Mian and Sufi, 2009). Defaulting is morally wrong is the 
percentage of people responding positively to the following question: ―Do you think that it is morally wrong to walk away 
from a house when one can afford to pay the monthly mortgage?‖ Know someone who has walked away is the percentage of 
people who answered positively to a question asking whether they knew somebody who have defaulted on their mortgage but 
still could afford to pay the monthly mortgage. Government should help homeowner is the percentage of respondents agreeing 
with that statement.  
 
 












Percentage of people declaring intention to default with:          
Negative equity=50K  9.38%  7.02%  20.00% 
Negative equity=100K  25.81%  21.96%  40.69% 
Negative equity=200K  41.23%  37.38%  59.15% 
Negative equity=300K  44.65%  38.12%  63.29% 
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          Panel B: Other Summary Statistics      
Variable  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs. 
Defaulting is morally wrong  0.81  1  0.39  0.00  1  1569 
Percentage of foreclosures in the area (as fraction of home 
loans)  0.04  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.36  1477 
Know someone who has walked away  0.09  0  0.29  0.00  1  1604 
Government should help homeowners  0.53  1  0.50  0.00  1  1532 
Age < 35  0.09  0  0.29  0.00  1  1646 
Age > 65  0.30  0  0.46  0.00  1  1646 
N. of kids in the household  0.55  0  0.99  0.00  5  1636 
Do you have kids in local schools?  0.26  0  0.44  0.00  1  815 
Own > $50K in financial assets excluding retirement?  0.53  1  0.50  0.00  1  774 
Bought/refinanced >5 years  0.69  1  0.46  0.00  1  1293 
House price expectations over next 5 years  3.57  4  0.89  1.00  5  1599 
Probability of becoming unemployed (%)  13.29  0  25.63  0.00  100  1495 
Value of the house  218,695  175,000  284,055  25,000  5,350,000  1378 
50K shortfall  as a fraction of the value of the house   0.34  0.29  0.23  0.01  2  1378 
100K shortfall as a fraction of the value of the house   0.68  0.57  0.45  0.02  4  1378 
Income (K dollars)  73.29  62.50  52.44  5.00  250  1468 
Risk aversion  6.27  6  2.51  1.00  10  1645 
Nonrecourse  0.30  0  0.46  0.00  1  1646 
Black  0.06  0  0.24  0.00  1  1646 
Hispanic  0.03  0  0.17  0.00  1  1646 
North east  0.22  0  0.41  0.00  1  1646 
South  0.34  0  0.48  0.00  1  1646 
West  0.19  0  0.39  0.00  1  1646 
North-Center  0.25  0  0.43  0.00  1  1646 
Republican  0.34  0  0.47  0.00  1  1593 
Democratic  0.35  0  0.48  0.00  1  1593 
Independent  0.30  0  0.46  0.00  1  1593 
Angry  3.70  4  1.30  1.00  5  1631 




Table 2: MSA-level Data 
 
 
The fraction of existing mortgages that are at least 120 days late at December 2008 by MSA area is from Equifax. 
The changes in house prices from their peak at the MSA level are from Zillow.com. The changes in the percentage 
level of unemployment during 2008 are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In Panel B the dependent variable is the 
fraction of existing mortgages that are at least 120 days. The estimation is by OLS. Robust standard errors are 




Panel A: Sample Statistics 
  Mean   Median  Std. Dev  Min  Max  N 
Mortagage delinquency  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.16  121 
Drop in house prices from the peak  -0.21  -0.17  0.16  -0.59  0.00  121 





Panel B: Regressions 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Whole sample  Whole sample  Unemployment change  House prices drop 
      Below median  Above median  Below median  Above median 
2008 changes   0.016***  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.005  0.001 
in unemployment  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Drop in house prices    -0.135***  -0.191***  -0.002  -0.034*  -0.161*** 
from the peak    (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
Constant  -0.002  0.004  -0.020*  0.018***  0.011*  -0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.015) 
Observations  121  121  60  61  60  61 
R-squared  0.247  0.567  0.53  0.017  0.091  0.544 30 
 
Table 3: Determinants of the Probability of Strategic Default 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the homeowner says s/he is willing to default when the value of his home equity equal -50 (in Panel A) or 
-100K (in Panel B) even if s/he can afford to pay the monthly mortgage  costs. All the other variables are defined in Table 1. The reported coefficients are 
marginal effect estimated with a probit model and computed at the mean of the independent variables. In columns (7) the reported coefficients are the 
marginal effect estimated through a probit model where ―default is morally wrong‖ is instrumented with indicator variables on whether the respondent is a 
Democrat, or a Republican. This model is estimated using  maximum likelihood estimation. Robust standard errors are in brackets. */**/*** indicates 
statistically significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
Panel A: Shortfall at -50K 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  wave=2  wave=2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2 
Default is morally wrong        -0.072**  -0.074**  -0.071**  -0.567**  -0.057**  -0.062** 
        (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.232)  (0.028)  (0.030) 
Percentage of           0.375***  0.363**  0.580***    0.380*** 
foreclosures in the area          (0.142)  (0.143)  (0.185)    (0.146) 
Know someone who has             0.048  0.058*  0.077*  0.051 
walked away            (0.035)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.037) 
Government should help                 0.017  0.011 
homeowners defaulting                (0.018)  (0.017) 
Age <=35  -0.061***  -0.062***  0.008  0.001  -0.013  -0.012  -0.047  0.002  -0.013 
  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.785)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.036)  (0.029)  (0.025) 
Age >=65  0.051  0.049  0.054**  0.053*  0.048*  0.050*  0.038  0.061**  0.049* 
  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.038)  (0.031)  (0.030) 
N. of kids  0.014  0.002  0.004  0.006  0.008  0.005  0.014  0.002  0.005 
  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.605)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Kids in local schools?  -0.030                 
  (0.036)                 
Own >$50K in fin. assets  0.009                 




-0.064*  -0.042**  -0.041**  -0.042**  -0.041**  -0.045*  -0.040*  -0.040* 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
House price expectations:  -0.016  -0.014  0.000  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.011  0.001  0.003 




0.001**  0.001***  0.001***  0.001**  0.001**  0.001*  0.001**  0.001** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Shortfall as a fraction of 
the  
0.103*** 
0.098***  0.099***  0.096***  0.095***  0.096***  0.122**  0.094***  0.097*** 
the value of  the house  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.002)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.052)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
Income: K dollars  -0.010  -0.015  -0.024  -0.023  -0.012  -0.012  -0.007  -0.022  -0.014 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.270)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
Risk aversion  -0.006  -0.006  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.000  -0.003  -0.002  -0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.543)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Nonrecourse  0.011  0.015  0.006  0.005  -0.005  -0.006  -0.012  0.003  -0.010 
  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.782)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.022) 
Black  0.082  0.076  0.037  0.031  0.020  0.025  -0.023  0.029  0.021 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.278)  (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.046)  (0.040)  (0.038) 
Hispanic  0.155  0.136  0.061  0.050  0.023  0.016  0.005  0.052  0.026 
  (0.124)  (0.120)  (0.267)  (0.064)  (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.058)  (0.066)  (0.059) 
Observations  493  500  939  920  847  835  816  862  792 31 
 
Panel B: 
Panel B: Shortfall at -100K 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  wave=2  wave=2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2  wave1&2 
Default is morally         -0.147***  -0.153***  -0.152***  -0.685***  -0.130***  -0.137*** 
wrong        (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.192)  (0.044)  (0.046) 
Percentage of          0.551*  0.465  0.749**    0.434 
foreclosure in area          (0.284)  (0.287)  (0.289)    (0.294) 
Know someone who            0.077  0.071  0.091*  0.070 
has walked away            (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Government should                  0.095***  0.091*** 
help homeowners                (0.030)  (0.031) 
Age <=35  -0.016  -0.035  0.123**  0.110*  0.087  0.093  0.000  0.098*  0.074 
  (0.074)  (0.073)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.037)  (0.056)  (0.058) 
Age >=65  0.118**  0.097*  0.122***  0.106**  0.118***  0.136***  0.091*  0.149***  0.157*** 
  (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.057)  (0.045)  (0.046) 
N. of kids  -0.054  -0.003  -0.002  -0.000  0.002  -0.001  0.015  0.003  0.006 
  (0.034)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
Kids in local schools?  0.150*                 
  (0.088)                 
Own >$50K in fin assets   -0.060                 
excluding retirement  (0.044)                 
Bougth/refinanced>  -0.087  -0.077  -0.033  -0.023  -0.042  -0.036  -0.027  -0.014  -0.033 
5 years ago  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.036) 
House price   -0.010  -0.007  -0.006  -0.006  -0.000  0.001  0.010  -0.011  -0.007 
expectations: 5yr   (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.018) 
Prob. become   0.002**  0.002***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001*  0.001**  0.001** 
Unemployed  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Shortfall as a fraction of   0.134***  0.135***  0.124***  0.123***  0.120***  0.115***  0.097**  0.125***  0.122*** 
the value of the house  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
Income:Kdollars  -0.002  -0.025  -0.019  -0.025  -0.008  -0.009  -0.001  -0.014  0.002 
  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.036) 
Risk aversion  -0.002  -0.004  0.006  0.005  0.007  0.005  -0.001  0.002  0.004 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Nonrecourse  -0.044  -0.042  -0.021  -0.018  -0.026  -0.021  -0.028  -0.012  -0.020 
  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.041) 
Black  0.112  0.125  0.026  0.005  -0.014  -0.046  -0.118  -0.051  -0.063 
  (0.088)  (0.089)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.059)  (0.053)  (0.053) 
Hispanic  0.262*  0.286**  0.222**  0.219**  0.192*  0.179*  0.123  0.236**  0.216** 
  (0.157)  (0.145)  (0.097)  (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.105) 
Observations  493  500  939  920  847  835  816  862  792 
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Table 4: Spline Regression 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the homeowner says s/he is willing to default when the value of his home equity 
equal -50 (first column) or -100K (second) even if s/he can afford to pay the monthly mortgage costs. All the other variables are defined 
in Table 1. The percentage of foreclosures is splined at the 75% level of the distribution of foreclosures. The reported coefficients are 
marginal effect estimated with a probit model and computed at the mean of the independent variables. Robust standard errors are in 




  Shortfall 50  Shortfall 100 










































































Observations  847  847 33 
 
Table 5: Determinants of Morality View 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the homeowner says it is morally wrong to default when you can afford to pay the 
monthly mortgage costs. All the other variables are defined in Table 1. The reported coefficients are marginal effect estimated with a probit 
model  and  computed  at  the  mean  of  the  independent  variables.  Robust  standard  errors  are  in  brackets.  */**/***  indicates  statistically 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
 
Dependent variable: Morally wrong to walk away? 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
























































































































Know someone who 
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(0.024) 
Observations  1407  1407  1382  1250  1220  1215  1148 
 
 
 
 
 
 